THE ARMY, THE KINGMAKERS IN ZIMBABWEAN POLITICS

 By Youngerson Matete 

On 28 October 2023, Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa appointed the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), General Philip Valerio Sibanda, to the ZANU-PF Politburo as an ex-officio member during the party’s 20th Annual People’s Conference. The Politburo serves as the apex decision-making body within ZANU-PF. This appointment has sparked widespread criticism, with many observers arguing it constitutes a direct violation of Section 208(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which explicitly prohibits members of the security services from being active participants or office-holders in any political party or organisation (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013).
Scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) and Magaisa (2020) have long observed the historical entanglement of the military and ruling party structures in Zimbabwe, tracing its roots to the liberation war era. The inclusion of Section 208 in the 2013 Constitution was designed to address this persistent problem by enforcing a clear separation between the military and political processes. The military has traditionally played a decisive role in determining Zimbabwe’s political direction, particularly during moments of leadership transition and electoral contestation (Raftopoulos, 2013; Sachikonye, 2011).
The controversial appointment came shortly after the disputed general elections held on 23–24 August 2023, which further entrenched Zimbabwe's ongoing political impasse. Unlike in 2018, when the military responded violently to post-election protests—resulting in the deaths of unarmed civilians—its role in 2023 appeared more subdued and opaque. This time, the Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), a shadowy organisation reportedly linked to the Central Intelligence Organisation, took centre stage in electoral processes, raising concerns about the outsourcing of repression (Matyszak, 2023).
The elevation of the Commander of the Defence Forces to ZANU-PF’s highest decision-making body serves as a stark reminder of the enduring conflation between the state’s security apparatus and party politics in Zimbabwe—an issue that continues to challenge the country’s democratic trajectory (Muzondidya, 2020).

The army and party conflation-the liberation struggle period  

The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, was marked by a prolonged and violent conflict between the white minority settler regime and the black majority population. Following the colonization of Zimbabwe in the 1890s, the Rhodesian government, under Ian Smith, entrenched a system of racial domination and economic exclusion, which eventually sparked widespread resistance. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the growing tensions proved ineffective, as the Smith regime remained intransigent. Consequently, nationalist movements such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) resorted to armed struggle to dismantle white minority rule (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Mlambo, 2014).

To operationalize their military ambitions, the nationalist parties established armed wings: ZANU formed the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). These military forces were based in neighbouring countries including Zambia, Tanzania, and later Mozambique, which provided strategic support and training grounds. The regional alliances reflected the broader Pan-African solidarity against colonialism and were crucial to the prosecution of the liberation war (Kriger, 1992; Sithole, 1999).

During this period, many leaders of the nationalist movements were imprisoned within Rhodesia. This imprisonment created a leadership vacuum that shifted the centre of power from civilian political structures to the military command. As the conflict intensified, the operational decisions and political direction of the liberation struggle increasingly came under the control of military commanders stationed outside the country. The military leaders began to assert authority, often independent of or in contradiction to the detained political elites (Nkomo, 1984; Chung, 2006).

This transition marked a fundamental shift in the nature of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, as military power began to eclipse civilian leadership in both tactical and strategic spheres. Scholars have argued that this militarization of decision-making during the struggle had long-term implications for the post-independence governance of Zimbabwe, embedding authoritarian tendencies and undermining democratic norms (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009; Muzondidya, 2009). The war thus not only facilitated national liberation but also redefined political power structures in ways that continued to influence Zimbabwe’s political trajectory after 1980. 

Assassination of Herbert Chitepo

Herbert Chitepo, a prominent nationalist leader and the first black barrister in Rhodesia, was assassinated on 18 March 1975 in Lusaka, Zambia. A car bomb planted in his Volkswagen Beetle detonated, killing him and one of his bodyguards, Silas Shamiso, instantly, while another, Sadat Kufamadzuba, sustained injuries. The explosion caused significant damage, including the uprooting of a nearby tree and injuries to neighbours, one of whom later succumbed (Kriger, 2003). At the time, the Zambia authorities pointed fingers at the internal fights within ZANU-PF, reflecting the tense political struggles within ZANU-PF. However, the true circumstances surrounding Chitepo’s death have remained contested in scholarly and political circles.

In response to the incident, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda initiated an official commission of inquiry. The findings, released in 2001, pointed to internal power struggles within ZANU as the likely cause of the assassination (Msindo, 2012). These internal tensions centred on leadership disputes, particularly concerning control over both the party’s political and military wings. While many in the military supported Chitepo as ZANU Chairman, key figures within the armed wing, especially Josiah Tongogara, resisted Chitepo’s involvement in military affairs. The divide underscored broader structural tensions between the political leadership and the guerrilla fighters (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

The discord came to a head during the fallout of the Nhari rebellion, a mutiny staged by young guerrilla fighters during the absence of senior commanders. Chitepo had opposed Tongogara’s demand to execute the rebels, favouring instead a more lenient disciplinary approach by stripping them of their ranks, acknowledging their grievances as valid (Moore, 2004). Tongogara, defying Chitepo’s decision, proceeded with the executions. This act not only widened the rift between the political and military leadership but also marked a critical breakdown in internal trust and cohesion. Scholars such as Sithole and Makumbe (1997) argue that these internal contradictions and factional conflicts played a significant role in Chitepo’s eventual assassination, symbolizing the violent complexities of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle 

The Mgagao Declaration-the removal of Ndabanhingi Sithole and subsequent promotion of Mugabe into party leadership

The Mgagao Declaration was a critical communique authored in November 1975 by junior ZANLA fighters based in Tanzania during the height of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Though widely attributed to youthful guerrilla combatants, the document reportedly had the tacit endorsement of senior military figures, including Rex Nhongo (known as Solomon Mujuru). However, Mujuru ultimately distanced himself from the document after it was leaked to the media and caused diplomatic friction, particularly with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who still supported Ndabaningi Sithole’s leadership at the time (Tendi, 2020).

The Declaration was more than just a rebellious text—it laid the groundwork for a significant shift in the trajectory of Zimbabwean liberation politics. It challenged Sithole’s authority and publicly discredited his leadership, thereby paving the way for Robert Mugabe’s ascendancy within ZANU. This transformation marked a turning point in which the military command of ZANLA began to exert overt influence over political decisions. Scholars such as Miles Tendi (2020) have emphasized that this was one of the first instances where the military wing directly shaped the party’s political direction, signaling the growing influence of figures like Solomon Mujuru in internal ZANU affairs.

By 1977, Mujuru would play a pivotal role in consolidating Mugabe’s power, underscoring the emergence of military dominance within ZANU structures—a trend that would continue to shape Zimbabwean politics in the post-independence era. As Norma Kriger (1992) has observed, the liberation war institutionalized a culture of military influence in party politics, a legacy that would later manifest in civil-military entanglements within the ruling elite. The Mgagao Declaration, therefore, was not only instrumental in replacing Sithole with Mugabe but also emblematic of a broader pattern where military force increasingly defined political legitimacy within Zimbabwe’s nationalist movement.

 

Independence and the Gukurahundi masscres 

Robert Mugabe’s ascent to power, facilitated in part by military backing, marked the beginning of a strategic alliance between the ruling party and the armed forces. During the lead-up to the 1980 elections, ZANU-PF employed the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces as tools of political mobilization and intimidation, particularly in rural areas. These forces were instrumental in coercing civilians to support ZANU-PF under threats of renewed conflict, thereby undermining the prospects for free and fair elections (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Kriger, 2003). The military, rather than being a neutral state institution, became deeply embedded in the party’s political machinery, effectively functioning as political commissars advancing partisan interests.

Following independence, the politicization of the army deepened, with the military becoming a guardian of ZANU-PF's dominance. This trend became most evident in the early 1980s, when Mugabe sanctioned the deployment of the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands. Ostensibly tasked with suppressing dissident activity among ZAPU supporters, the campaign—later termed Gukurahundi—resulted in widespread atrocities, including the massacre of an estimated 20,000 civilians (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Alexander, McGregor & Ranger, 2000). The army, under Mugabe’s directive, was no longer an institution of national defense, but an apparatus of violent repression used to consolidate political authority.

The legacy of Gukurahundi and the continued militarization of Zimbabwean politics reflect a broader pattern in which state institutions have been manipulated to serve the interests of a dominant party elite. Scholars argue that Mugabe's use of the military blurred the lines between the state and party, creating a deeply securitized political environment where dissent was often equated with treason (Raftopoulos, 2004; Sachikonye, 2011). This alignment between the military and ZANU-PF has endured over the decades, making democratic transition and genuine civil-military separation exceedingly difficult in Zimbabwe.

2000 land reform and the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change role of the army in thwarting political dissent.

At the dawn of the new millennium, Zimbabwe's political and economic landscape was marked by intensifying instability. As the economy deteriorated rapidly, President Robert Mugabe faced growing unpopularity, particularly following the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a formidable opposition party led by former Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Secretary General, Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC's rise represented a significant shift in Zimbabwean politics, challenging the long-standing dominance of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) (Raftopoulos, 2009; Sachikonye, 2011).

Mugabe suffered a significant political blow in 2000 when the electorate rejected a proposed new constitution in a national referendum. This unprecedented loss fueled fears within ZANU–PF of an impending electoral defeat. In response, the government sanctioned the violent seizure of white-owned commercial farms, which was portrayed as a corrective land reform but widely perceived as a strategy to punish political dissenters and consolidate Mugabe’s waning support. These land invasions, led by war veterans and backed by segments of the military, were accompanied by widespread political violence and intimidation directed at MDC supporters and the remaining white community, who were accused of funding the opposition (Moyo, 2011; Alexander, 2003).

Following these events, the security sector increasingly became a tool for political repression. The military and police were instrumental in orchestrating brutal crackdowns on opposition supporters, often justifying their actions by invoking the rhetoric of liberation struggle credentials. Military commanders openly declared that the presidency was reserved for individuals who had participated in the liberation war, thus disqualifying Tsvangirai and undermining democratic processes. Although Tsvangirai won the first round of the 2008 presidential elections, he was ultimately prevented from assuming power through a combination of electoral manipulation and military intervention (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2009).

November 2017 coup and the military consolidation

The internal succession struggle within Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) intensified in 2017 as the party approached its annual people’s conference. The succession contest was marked by a fierce rivalry between two factions: the "Generation 40" (G40), composed primarily of younger members who lacked liberation war credentials, and the "Lacoste" faction, dominated by veterans of the liberation war and aligned with then Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The G40 faction, closely associated with First Lady Grace Mugabe, sought to modernize the party, while the Lacoste faction clung to the legacy of the liberation struggle (Nkomo, 2019; Mlambo, 2020).

Grassroots support for the liberation war rhetoric was waning, particularly among the youth and urban electorate. The Lacoste faction, although grounded in the party’s historical legitimacy, faced increasing resistance from within the party structures as its members were systematically purged in the lead-up to the December conference. As observed by Sachikonye (2018), this factionalism underscored the generational and ideological shifts within ZANU-PF, with Mnangagwa’s camp suffering significant blows. His dismissal from the party and government on 6 November 2017 signaled a turning point. Fearing for his safety, Mnangagwa fled to South Africa, marking a temporary fall from grace.

However, the removal of Mnangagwa was not the end of the struggle; rather, it triggered decisive action from the military establishment. Just over a week later, on 15 November, the military initiated what was later framed as a “military-assisted transition.” Tanks rolled into Harare, and the long-serving President Robert Mugabe was placed under house arrest. As scholars such as Masunungure and Bratton (2018) note, the coup, though bloodless, marked a fundamental reshaping of Zimbabwe’s civil-military relations, positioning the army once again as a key arbiter in the country’s political affairs.

This military intervention redefined power dynamics in Zimbabwe. With Mnangagwa returned from exile and installed as president, it became apparent that political legitimacy now heavily depended on military support. The events that followed — including the violent suppression of post-election protests on 1 August 2018 and the brutal crackdown on dissent in January 2019 — reaffirmed the military’s dominance in both governance and electoral outcomes (Mare, 2021; Duri, 2022). As long as the military retains the authority to install or remove leaders, Zimbabwe's democratic processes remain constrained by an entrenched securocratic elite. 

In conclusion, the army has played the “kingmaker” role several times in Zimbabwean politics. Without a clear strategy on how to deal with a politicized military, it will be difficult to take over power from ZANU-PF. We might be stuck with Mnangagwa for years if we do not have a proper strategy on how we can deal with the elephant in the room- which is the military. Some may extend hope to an internal explosion within the ZANU-PF party but it is interesting to see where it might come from. 

Is the Vice President ambitious enough or does he feel fulfilled by playing both the king-breaker and maker in 2017? Something he might feel that he has either equalized or surpassed Solomon Mujuru who had done the same during the liberation struggle- a man he dreaded a lot, who he had attempted to commit suicide fearing disciplinary measures after he had plagiarized a military academy test. A man he accused of bedding his then-wife in his bedroom and left a jacket with his name tag- a daring movie. It remains to be seen if the former general has more ambition than what he has done already.

If another element might arise within the military or ZANU-PF to challenge the status quo or if the opposition will mount a formidable challenge which looks less likely. However, what is to be noted is that the army and ZANU-PF as things stand operate as one entity. The army is heavily invested in civilian politics as they feel that they have the divine right to appoint who leads Zimbabwe. This is also influenced by the army’s economic interests. The top elites in the army have made significant business enterprises in the Zimbabwean economic sector which in most cases they have done so fraudulently. A change in government threatened their business empire. 

 Elections are no longer a solution in Zimbabwe as has over the years failed to lead to the transfer of power no matter how popular the opposition could be. What needs to be done, is the answer I don’t have at the moment but it is the question we must answer as a collective people.

Youngerson Matete is a pro-democracy and Human Rights activist, a student of Political Science. He is the founder of Project Vote 263, a youth-led initiative to foster inclusive participatory democracy in Zimbabwe. He writes in his own capacity. His views doesn't not represents any organisation.

Cell : +263 773 622 044

Email: youngmatete0@gmail.com/ director@projectvote263.org.zw