President Mnangagwa looks set to extend his stay in power beyond 2028 as his political nemesis scatters in confusion and disarray.
By Youngerson Matete
Introduction
The ongoing discussions surrounding the potential extension or removal of presidential term limits in Zimbabwe, along with the possibility of postponing the 2028 elections to 2030, have ignited significant political debate. As stipulated in Zimbabwe's constitution, the current president, Dr. Emmerson D. Mnangagwa, is not eligible to contest another term following the expiration of his five-year tenure. However, momentum for a 2030 agenda has been growing. During the ZANU-PF People’s National Conference in October 2024, extending Mnangagwa’s term to 2030 emerged as a key resolution, although the president has publicly stated his disinterest in pursuing an extension—claims he has reiterated on various platforms, internally he is the key driver for the agenda. Analysts such as Ndlovu (2023) highlight that such proposals reflect the party's internal dynamics and a broader trend in Zimbabwean politics of prioritizing political stability over constitutional adherence.
This year has seen heightened efforts to advance the 2030 agenda, with notable support from, Political players, a faction of the opposition led by Sengezo Tshabangu, the self-proclaimed Secretary-General of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and now leader of the opposition in parliament, have openly pledged to back the move. Tshabangu’s alignment with this agenda demonstrates what Gumede (2023) describes as the fluidity and opportunism within Zimbabwe’s political landscape, where personal and factional interests often overshadow institutional and constitutional principles. Such developments have reignited debates about the balance between political pragmatism and the democratic commitments enshrined in Zimbabwe's constitution.
President Mnangagwa’s rise to power- A coup, which was not a coup.
To contextualize the current political landscape in Zimbabwe, it is essential to revisit the historical events surrounding the rise to power of President Emmerson D. Mnangagwa. It must be noted that I do not claim to be an expert on this subject; rather, I aim to synthesize publicly available information to foster dialogue. Mnangagwa assumed office in November 2017 following what has been widely described as a military coup, though some refer to it as a military-assisted transition. This occurred two weeks after his dismissal by the then-president and long-time ally, Robert G. Mugabe. As scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020) and Mandaza (2019) have noted, the transition was marked by significant constitutional irregularities, casting a shadow over the legitimacy of the political shift.
The rise of Mnangagwa to power underscores a broader pattern of governance challenges in Zimbabwe. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, Mnangagwa's ascent via unconstitutional means signifies a continuation of political illegality, which raises critical questions about the capacity of such leadership to resolve the crises it perpetuates. Mandaza further critiques the notion that a leadership born out of illegality can serve as a genuine agent of reform, emphasizing the systemic issues that undermine democratic governance in Zimbabwe. Against this backdrop, it becomes increasingly evident that addressing the root causes of political instability requires both a legal and a moral reckoning with the circumstances that brought the current administration into power.
President Mnangagwa’s Machiavelli holding onto power tactics.
Since 2017, Zimbabwe’s president has employed a range of unconventional and authoritarian strategies reminiscent of Machiavelli's advice to consolidate his grip on power. These strategies include suppressing both internal dissent within his party, ZANU-PF, and external opposition from political rivals and civil society actors. He has orchestrated the fragmentation of opposition movements, engineering unconstitutional takeovers of leadership structures—from the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) to the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC)—through the use of proxies. Furthermore, his administration has systematically weakened civil society, stifled civil liberties, and eradicated prospects for popular protests, leaving little room for democratic resistance. Scholars such as Alexander Rusero and Eldred Masunungure have highlighted how these maneuvers erode democratic norms and create a climate of fear within Zimbabwe's political landscape.
Drawing parallels with Vladimir Putin's model of governance, the president has captured key state institutions, including the judiciary and parliament, to tighten his control and neutralize accountability mechanisms. This institutional capture ensures the continuation of his rule while undermining the checks and balances essential for democracy. Through a combination of coercion, manipulation, and strategic dismantling of opposition forces, he has demonstrated an unwillingness to tolerate dissent, further entrenching autocratic governance. As scholars like Ibbo Mandaza have observed, these actions illustrate a deliberate strategy to consolidate power, signaling that the current leadership has no intention of relinquishing its dominance in Zimbabwe's political arena.
The constitution is the only hindrance to the 2030 agenda.
The Zimbabwean constitution has emerged as a significant obstacle to President Mnangagwa's plans to remain in power beyond his current term. Section 91(2) of the constitution stipulates that an individual who has held the presidency for two terms (as defined in section 143 of the constitution), whether continuous or not, is no longer eligible to run for the office. Furthermore, sections 328(7) and (8) explicitly mandate that any amendments to presidential term limits must be subjected to a referendum, and even if such an amendment passes, the incumbent president cannot benefit from it. Given these provisions, any constitutional changes to extend or remove term limits before the 2028 elections, as well as suggestions to postpone elections to 2030, face insurmountable legal hurdles. Section 158 of the constitution further solidifies this by requiring elections to occur within five years and 30 days of the expiry of the presidential term, barring extraordinary circumstances such as war or natural disaster.
Despite these legal constraints, there is precedent for constitutional provisions being ignored or manipulated in Zimbabwe’s political history. For instance, both the terms of office for the current Chief Justice and the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces were extended, despite constitutional limitations. Scholars like Alexander Rusero and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni have emphasized how Zimbabwe’s ruling elites often prioritize political expediency over constitutionalism, using institutional control to maintain power. Such actions underscore the ruling ZANU-PF party’s ability to bypass legal guardrails when their political survival is at stake.
Given these dynamics, it would be politically naive to assume that constitutional provisions alone can prevent President Mnangagwa from staying in power beyond 2028. As Lloyd Sachikonye argues, Zimbabwe’s governance is marked by the entrenchment of a political elite that views the constitution as a flexible tool rather than a binding framework. The interplay between legal constraints and political maneuvering reflects a broader pattern where formal institutions are frequently subordinated to the interests of those in power, raising critical questions about the future of democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.
The enablers, and likely scenarios towards 2028
The constitution alone isn’t enough to stop the President from occupying the state house beyond his term limits. It is also important to understand that since its formation ZANU-PF has never had a constitutional transfer of power internally. The change of leadership in ZANU-PF has always been orchestrated and enforced by the military through the gun. This is important to map likely scenarios and the enablers or possibly hindrances to the 2030 agenda.
In the 2030 conversation the military has remained silent making it difficult to get its position but given that its commander has also benefited from the illegal term extension one can only speculate. There is also another critical pillar to look at which is the private sector. There has been an emergency of black business elites who have been corruptly benefiting from state tenders. This group who are on the feeding trough will seriously enable the 2030 agenda. They are backing it financially on a serious industrial scale.
The other pillar to look at is the politicians within ZANU-PF as it is difficult currently to look at the opposition or civil society as they have been totally destroyed and later reduced to hotel programming with zero meaningful impact. There is a little challenge unless things change that we can expect from politicians they most certainly look like from across the divide they want to enable the 2030 agenda.
The other pillar we must look at is the Chinese who have significant investments in the country. The Chinese are the major investors in the country across many sectors with corrupt capital which may not survive in a democratic space. The Chinese will certainly back the 2030 agenda as they can’t risk their investments.
Several likely scenarios can happen from now to 2028. The first scenario is that the current president will extend or remove term limits and stay beyond, the second scenario is that his vice president Constantine Chiwenaga will succeed him, the third scenario is that the military may stage a coup and impose their preferred candidate, the fourth scenario is that there might be a democratic breakthrough led by the people and the final scenario is that God’s time may happen to the current president. Given that he is 86 there is a possibility of death. I have put these scenarios as not the only scenarios-there may be many but I have just put them as speculation and I am resisting to state which is the most likely as I also don't know. I have left it to you to add or decide what you think is the most likely scenario.
The need to go back to grassroots political organizing to resist the 2030 agenda.
The only viable path forward to challenge the 2030 agenda is through the power of the people, particularly by revitalizing grassroots civil society. As Zimbabwean political analyst David Moore (2017) argues, civil society at the grassroots level has the potential to act as a counterbalance to state power and help in organizing the disillusioned populace. While legal frameworks like the Constitution are important, they are not sufficient in addressing the core political issues the country faces. The Constitution alone will not prevent the sitting president from extending his term indefinitely, as legal mechanisms have repeatedly been undermined in Zimbabwe's political history. Scholars like Stephen Chan (2018) emphasize that Zimbabwe's political environment has seen a shift where constitutional norms are less effective than political power plays.
It is crucial to acknowledge that the 2017 coup, which ousted long-time dictator, Robert Mugabe, was not only a political upheaval but also a constitutional breach, as the ruling class blatantly disregarded constitutional principles in their bid for power. As Mambo (2019) notes, this action demonstrates how easily the Constitution can be sidelined when political elites are driven by ambition and control. The difficulty of amending the Constitution is minimal compared to the ease with which military intervention was executed. Therefore, a legal approach that relies solely on the Constitution is inadequate. Instead, the focus must shift to organizing the economically, socially, and politically marginalized masses, who have grown weary of the political system and are increasingly disengaged from the political process. This people-centered approach offers the only real hope for overcoming the current political stagnation in Zimbabwe.
Youngerson Matete is a multi-award-winning pro-democracy and Human Rights activist, a Mandela Washington Fellowship Alumni, and a student of human rights and Politics. He is the founder of Project Vote 263, African Network For Democracy, National Constitutional Movement, and The School of Governance and Center For Democracy. He writes in his own capacity. His views doesn't represent any organization.
Cell: +263 773 622 044
Email:youngmatete0@gmail.com/ director@projectvote263.org.zw
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