Constitutional Engineering and Brittle Institutions: The Risks of Extending President Mnangagwa’s Tenure.

 By Youngerson Matete 

The concept of constitutional engineering is defined by Giovanni Sartori as the deliberate design and structuring of constitutional rules and political institutions to shape political outcomes and governance. In his influential work Comparative Constitutional Engineering, Sartori explains it as the intentional crafting of institutional arrangements, such as electoral systems, executive authority, and parliamentary structures, to produce particular political results. Building on this, Arend Lijphart explored how constitutional arrangements can be engineered for political maneuvering, while Donald L. Horowitz argued that electoral and executive structures can be deliberately designed to influence political behaviour, reduce conflict, and encourage cooperation among competing groups. Together, these scholars present constitutional engineering as a framework to understand how political rules are intentionally shaped to determine the distribution and exercise of power.

This conceptual framework helps explain how political actors shape institutions to influence power, yet when applied in brittle systems, it can have destabilizing effects. In Zimbabwe, the push to extend presidential tenure illustrates this interplay. Specifically, attempts to change the Constitution to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s last term from 5 to 7 years will backfire. While proponents present the amendment as reform, their approach violates constitutional safeguards, which clearly define the proper amendment procedures. It is important to stress that constitutions can be amended, but only through legitimate, prescribed processes. Zimbabwe’s political system has historically fractured when leaders attempted to bend it to their will, often losing power in the process. Like metals that cannot bend under stress, such systems are rigid, and excessive pressure can cause them to break.

Against this backdrop, the debate surrounding Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 has reopened fundamental questions about power, constitutionalism, and political stability. The proposal to extend the presidential term from five to seven years pushes the current cycle beyond the 2013 constitutional timeline. Critics argue that the amendment also seeks to bypass Section 328, which mandates that any extension of presidential term limits must be subjected to a referendum. Even if voters approve, the incumbent cannot benefit without a second referendum held at least six months apart. The concern is not just the extension itself, but the manner in which it is pursued and the institutional precedent it sets. While proponents claim public support, there is little willingness to allow citizens to reaffirm this position through legitimate constitutional channels.

When examined through the lens of political history, Zimbabwe faces significant risks to stability. The dominant party, ZANU-PF, has long exhibited institutional rigidity, or what analysts describe as brittleness. Like a brittle metal that fractures under pressure, political institutions that cannot manage leadership transitions through legitimate mechanisms tend to experience abrupt ruptures rather than gradual reform. Systems that allow debate, reform, and predictable succession can absorb pressure and remain stable, while those that suppress flexibility accumulate tension until they break. Zimbabwe’s political history offers clear illustrations of this dynamic.

For example, in 1975, Ndabaningi Sithole was removed through the Mgagao Declaration following internal disputes. Sithole and ZANU-PF had neither established mechanisms for leadership renewal nor encouraged internal debate, stifling party democracy. Disagreements escalated unchecked and culminated in his removal, paving the way for Robert Mugabe to assume control. In this instance, the institution did not bend, it fractured.

Building on this pattern, decades later, Mugabe replicated similar dynamics. He manipulated elections, suppressed opposition, and sought to shape succession within the party to favour his wife, Grace Mugabe. By the mid-2010s, both internal and external pathways for legitimate transition were blocked. This tension ultimately erupted in Operation Restore Legacy in 2017, a military takeover that forced Mugabe to resign and elevated Mnangagwa to the presidency. Once again, the system fractured rather than reformed gradually.

These examples reveal a consistent institutional pattern: when leadership succession is blocked, political pressure accumulates and is resolved through extraordinary intervention rather than gradual adaptation. Scholars of African politics and authoritarian resilience, such as Miles Tendi, note that Zimbabwe’s security apparatus has long been intertwined with the ruling party, managing internal competition often at the expense of institutional norms. This fusion of party and security interests directly contributes to institutional brittleness.

Moreover, contemporary research on coups shows that they are most likely in systems where legitimate pathways for succession are obstructed. Studies in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that when institutional mechanisms for leadership change are blocked, elites often resort to extraordinary measures. Systems that extend tenure indefinitely or manipulate constitutional rules are particularly vulnerable, as frustrated elites conclude that existing mechanisms cannot resolve disputes.

In Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s removal in 2017 exemplifies this dynamic. Years of blocked succession within and beyond the party led internal factions and the military to intervene. Extending presidential tenure today risks recreating similar conditions. If transition timelines are uncertain or politically manipulated, competing factions may again seek extraordinary measures. 
The president may try to coup-proof by appointing loyalists to key positions, creating parallel party structures, and distributing patronage as a way to reduce the risk of coup.

However, these strategies often produce unintended consequences. They fragment party and security structures, weaken national institutions, and intensify factional competition. Most importantly, the strategy centers around loyalty but loyalty by nature is not permanent. As time moves and interests changes. Old alliances breaks as new alliances are built and loyalty is lost.The succession battles will not go away but simple postponed and will reappear ugly in not so distant future.

 Rising tensions within the party, and state visible in figures like Vice President Constantine Chiwenga, suggest a potentially violent struggle ahead. As my father (MHSRIP) used to say, when it is about to rain, the wind becomes still, creatures hide, and there is little noise—you can smell the rain. Similarly, the signs of impending political upheaval in Zimbabwe are unmistakable.

The stability of modern political systems depends on the legitimacy of constitutional rules. Citizens and elites must trust that leadership transitions follow predictable procedures. Altering constitutional provisions to extend tenure erodes this trust. While this does not automatically trigger instability, it increases the likelihood that future disputes escalate into crises. From Sithole’s removal in 1975 to Mugabe’s ouster in 2017, Zimbabwe’s leadership changes have repeatedly occurred through rupture rather than institutional process.

This historical pattern underscores the importance of maintaining clear and legitimate succession rules. Scholars emphasize that institutional legitimacy and well-established norms are central to democratic stability. When leaders manipulate the constitution to extend tenure, they weaken the foundations of political order.

Ultimately, the greatest lesson from Zimbabwe’s political history is that, as in science, metals that cannot bend eventually break. Pursuing efforts to extend the presidential term and allowing Mnangagwa to benefit without public consent is likely to provoke violent conflict. The current leadership appears to have learned nothing, setting the stage for chaotic transition and potential removal. In repeating these mistakes, they risk the same political ruptures that have destabilized Zimbabwe before.

Attempts to cling to power under the guise of stability often produce the opposite effect. When succession timelines are uncertain, competition intensifies beneath the surface, factions position for future struggles, and elite alliances weaken. In such environments, extraordinary intervention becomes more likely. The debate over extending presidential tenure goes beyond constitutional technicalities; it speaks to the nature of power and the resilience of institutions. Systems that bend remain stable, while those that cannot eventually break. Zimbabwe’s future stability may ultimately depend on whether its institutions choose flexibility over brittle rigidity.

This is my first blog of the year, written in memory of my father, Sheunesu Matete, who passed away on 25 January 2026, just three days before my birthday. From my earliest childhood, he taught me the ways of politics, even though we often held different views. He would often say, whenever he saw me winning arguments in debates and political clashes over the years, that politics is a dirty game, and indeed, Shumba, this time it has turned even dirtier. May his soul rest in peace.

Email; youngmatete0@gmail.com